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a b s t r a c t
Since the late 1970s the central government of China has initiated several ecological environ-
mental protection projects. The most significant of these has been the tui geng huan lin
(returning cultivated land to forest and pasture) project in operation since the late 1990s.
China’s northwest region is characterized by lack ofwater resources, yet such resourcesareof
vital importance.There isscantdiscussion in the literature (including inChina)onthe linkages
between the environmental protection projects andwatermanagement practices. This paper
analyses how central government environmental protection projects are interpreted in the
local setting, and how local water management policies and practices correspond to the
projects.The conclusion is that localwatermanagementpolicies andpractices are interlinked
withboth central governmentand local governmentpolicies on theenvironmental protection
projects, and a newprocess for the redistribution ofwater has been established.When equity
and social costs are not factored into the planning of new environmental protection projects,
the social costs may be as high as the environmental costs.
# 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
avai lable at www.sc iencedi rec t .com
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci1. Introduction
Since the late 1970s, the central government of China has
initiated several ecological environmental protection projects
(MacBean, 2007; Zhang andWen, 2008). The state Three North
(sanbei) ecological forest protection project began in 1978 and
is scheduled to be completed in eight phases by 2050, covering
a total of 13 provinces and autonomous regions (590 counties)
in northern China.1 The main tasks of the project are to
increase tree coverage, protect farmland from wind and sand
invasion, and preserve soils.* Correspondence address: Xinjiang Institute of Ecology and Geograph
Urumqi, China. Tel.: +86 13139625375 (China)/+46 46 2223481 (Sweden
E-mail address: yulingshen@ms.xjb.ac.cn.
1 The Three North (sanbei) Ecological Forest Construction Bureau of t
see the Three North (sanbei) Ecological Forest Construction Bureau of
gcjj.htm).
1462-9011/$ – see front matter # 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserve
doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2009.03.006From the late 1990s, the central government of China has
forcefully pursued a project called tui geng huan lin, which
translates as returning cultivated land to forest and pasture
(Notice of the State Council on Perfecting the Policy of
Returning Cultivated Land to Forest and Pasture, 2007; The
Regulations on Returning Cultivated Land to Forest and
Pasture, 2002). The tui geng huan lin project is one package of
the state Three North (sanbei) ecological forest protection
project. The reasons for initiating this project are complex.
According to Xu and Cao (2002), the trigger was the disaster of
water running dry in the lower reaches of the Yellow Rivery, Chinese Academy of Sciences, South Beijing Road 40-3, 830011,
); fax.: +86 991 7885320 (China).
he State Forest Bureau is responsible for the work (for more details
the State Forest Bureau’s website: http://www.3northforest.com/
d.
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Huge damage was recognized and blamed by the central
government to be the land and water erosion and ecological
destruction in the upper reaches of the two river basins.
However, Tao et al. (2004) argue that the main reason for
initiating the project was the grain surplus in China in the late
1990s, i.e. the need to reduce stored grain and the huge
financial deficits of the government grain sectors, as well as
the regime reforms relating to grain purchase and sale.
A number of recent studies have focused on the environ-
mental protection projects in China (Jiang, 2004, 2006; Wang
and Pei, 2004; Yu et al., 2006). According toWang and Pei (2004)
the tui geng huan lin project has evidently improved ecological
conditions in some areas, but it has also been hampered by the
inappropriate selection of areas to be reforested, partly due to
local government officers being driven to report progress.
Since the late 1990s, in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous
Region (XUAR), as a consequence of central government’s
Great Western Development Strategy, the focal point has
become the protection of the ecological environment of the
lower reaches of the Tarim River Basin (Hou et al., 2005, 2006;
Jiang et al., 2005; Xu et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2006; Zhu and Lei,
2003).2 Zhu and Lei (2003) claim that the tui geng huan lin project
will definitely improve the ecological systems of oases in
Xinjiang, although to date the benefits have not been readily
apparent. Further, Xu et al. (2008) claim that the ecological
degradation in lower reaches of the Tarim Basin has clearly
been reversed, and positive effects on local agricultural
development have been observed.
There are many rhyming couplets in China about tree
planting, such as ‘plant trees, construct nothing’ and ‘year
after year planted trees die, year after year planting trees at the
same place’.3 The failure of tree planting is normally imputed
as due to bad treemanagement andweak public participation.
For example, Yu et al. (2006) argue that ‘due to insufficient
public participation, long-term management may become a
serious challenge’. Xinjiang is an arid region, and is char-
acterized by lack ofwater resources. Althoughwater resources
are of vital importance, and the fact that plants cannot grow
without irrigation, there has been scant discussion on the
linkage between the environmental protection projects and
water management practices.
The primary goal of this study is to understand water and
land management practices in one river basin in Xinjiang,
from river basin level to individual farmer household level.
The central government advocated the environmental protec-
tion projects, which have been carried out on a large and
spectacular scale in the study area. Water and land manage-
ment practices are closely related to the projects. Accordingly,
this paper analyses how the central government’s environ-2 Since the late 1990s, it has become popular to improve the
ecological environment of the lower reaches of the Tarim River.
The central government invested c. 10.7 billion yuan (1
USD = 8.3 yuan in 2001) between 2001 and 2005 to improve the
management of the Tarim River. One of the main efforts was to
divert water from Bosteng Lake to the Daxihaizi Reservoir (Xinhua
News, 2001).
3 Respectively, ‘zhishu zao ling’ (in Chinese, wood and zero (noth-
ing) are almost homophonic) and ‘niannian zhishu niannian huang,
niannian zhishu laodifang’.mental protection projects are interpreted in the local setting,
and how water management practices are linked to the
environmental protection projects. The cases in the study area
show that equity and social costs are not factored into the
planning of new environmental protection projects, while the
economic cost of green highways, such as the desert highway,
is high,4 and in terms of the lives of farmers needing water to
survive, the cost is even higher.
In the following sections, firstly, I introduce the study area
and study method. Secondly, I briefly describe how water is
managed in the study area. Thirdly, I introduce how the
central government policies are interpreted in the local
government documents. Fourthly, I describe how water
management policies and practices are linked to the environ-
ment protection projects. In the final section, I present my
conclusions.
2. The study area and study method
Xinjiang is located in the northwest of China. The Tianshan
mountain ranges extend from east to west in the centre of
Xinjiang and divide the region into two: the Junggar Basin in
the north, and the Tarim Basin to the south (Fig. 1). The Tarim
Basin, covering an area of 0.5 million km2, is the largest inland
basin in the world. Within the Tarim Basin, the Taklamagan
Desert constitutes the second largest desert in the world. The
climate of the Tarim Basin is extremely dry: the annual
precipitation in the lowland is only 50–70 mm, whereas the
potential evaporation of free water in the same area is in the
range of 2000–3000 mm/year (Li, 1991). Approximately 100
years ago, the famous Swedish geographer, Hedin (1904, 1905)
travelled along the Tarim River, which flows over a distance of
more than 1000 km from west to east in the Tarim Basin. He
measured themain courses of the TarimRiver, and the life and
death of the branches of the Tarim River. Every year, when the
flood season came, mud and sand were swept, poplars and
bushes either grew or declined according to the changing
water courses. In the parts of the desert reached by riverwater,
life existed. However, after the river changed its course,
vegetation dried and died, and people had to move to other
places.
My study area is located within the area administered by
Bayinguoleng Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture (Bazhou).
The Kaidu-Kongque River constitutes the main surface water
resource in Bazhou. The Kaidu River originates in the
Tianshan Mountains, where annual precipitation is c.
400 mm. From there it flows a distance of 560 km, before
entering Bosteng Lake. The Kongque River starts from Bosteng
Lake, and forms the lower reaches of the Kaidu River. In 2000,
approximately 172,000 ha of land were irrigated by diverting
water from the Kaidu-Kongque River (interview data).4 Investment in green desert highway construction was 0.22
billion yuan (Xinhua News, 2005). The important role of this green
highway is stated thus: to protect the highway, improve the eco-
environment, and promote economic development in southern
Xinjiang. No questions have been raised concerning how many
years the green coverage could last.
Fig. 1 – Map of Xinjiang (modified from Yang, 1987).
Table 1 – Comparison of the population in Xinjiang in
1949 and 2006 (unit: million).
Year Total
population
Uyghur Han Other ethnic
groups
1949 4.33 3.29 0.29 0.75
2006 20.50 9.41 8.12 2.97
Source: XUAR CCP Committee and XUAR People’s Government
(2000), XUAR Statistics Bureau (2007).
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speaking Uyghur making up almost half of the population. In
addition, there are Kazak, Hui, Kirgiz, Mongolian, Xibe, and
other minority ethnic groups. Since 1949 there has been
substantial in-migration to Xinjiang fromother parts of China:
Xinjiang’s population increased very rapidly from 4.3 million
in 1949 to 20.5 million in 2006 (Table 1). The migration of Han
Chinese to Xinjiang since 1949 has drastically altered the
traditional population balance of the region. In 1949, the Han
Chinese accounted for c. 7%, and the Uyghur ethnic group
accounted for c. 76%. In 2006, HanChinese accounted for c. 40%
and the Uyghur ethnic group accounted for c. 46%.
There are two administrative systems in Xinjiang, one is
the local government system, the other is the Bingtuan
system, which currently has 14 divisions (numbered from 1 to
14), in addition to several departments. The Bingtuan system
has provincial government authority, and its economy and
social development are carried out both separately and
exclusively under the state plan (Cliff, 2005; Seymour, 2000).
Agriculture Division No. 2 in the Bingtuan system has
developed large-scale irrigation agriculture in the Kaidu-
Kongque River Basin.
After 1949, the target of irrigation-agriculture development
in Xinjiang is to convert desert into farmland (Fig. 2). Opening
up wasteland is strongly encouraged by both central and local
governments, and increasing the amount of cultivated land is
a key goal of agricultural development at all levels of the
government. Large areas of wasteland (huangdi, meaning
unused land, including wetland, forest, grassland, and desert)
have been openedup and become cultivated land. Statistics onthe areas that have been ‘opened up’ have become one of the
most important measure of agricultural development at all
levels of government. Less attention has been given to the
consequences of the loss of grassland and forests. In general,
crop farming is stressed and animal husbandry is perceived as
being inferior to some extent. In 1949 the cultivated areawas c.
1.2 million ha. By 2006 the cultivated area had increased to 3.6
million ha (XUAR Statistics Bureau, 2007). However, many
areas of opened land had to be abandoned due to problems
relating to lack of water and soil salinization (Shen and Lein,
2005). Today, the local government still actively encourages
farmers to save money to open up the ‘five wastelands’:
wasteland (desert), waste beaches, waste sloping land, waste
wetland, and waste hillside land. The policy is that ‘whoever
invests in opening up wasteland receives the benefit from it’,
and anyone can open up asmuchwasteland as they can afford
(Shen, 2007).
Castree (2001: 3) argues that ‘nature is defined, delimited,
and even physically reconstituted by different societies, often
Fig. 2 – Members of the Bingtuan clearing land in the Tarim Basin (CIA, 1971).
The original text accompanying the photo is as follows: ‘Members of the Sinkiang Production and Construction Corps clear
land in the Tarim Basin preparatory to planting. The dead trees and undergrowth being removed are the remains of a dense
poplar-willow-tamarisk jungle that once flourished along the banks of a now dry stream channel. Live trees and bushes in
the background indicate an active watercourse’.
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interests’. Castree suggests that the question of what types
of artificial nature exist today, and for whose benefit and with
what social and ecological consequences, should be asked
when discussing environmental problems. These are
addressed below in relation to Xinjiang.
During the last half century in Xinjiang, by terming natural
forest land, grassland, wetland, and desert as ‘wasteland’, the
utilization of the natural resources by indigenous people
(farmers and herdsmen) has been rendered non-existent. The
expansion of cultivated land and redistribution of natural
resources (including water and land resources) has become a
question of rationality and politically positive; in other words,
the entire of society can obtain benefits by exploiting unused
land. Thereby, the problems ofwater resource shortages in the
dry region have effectively become redundant. Hunt and Hunt
(1976) have shown that water shortage is not an absolute
concept. Where there is irrigation agriculture, there is social
stratification, and the decision-making power over the tasks of
the irrigation system is linked to the stratification. Today, with
central government advocating the return of cultivated land to
forest, the relationship between the abstract slogan ‘to make
desert green’ and the concrete policies and practices of local
government is much more complex than might be expected.
This paper is based on a review of various government
documents and information collected through interviews
with water managers at various levels in the government
water management organizations, and also interviews with
local leaders and farmers in villages in 2000, 2001, 2002, and
2004. In order to gain information on the formal government
regulations, government documents relating to irrigation
agricultural development and environmental protection as
well as land and water management were collected and
studied. The main sources of these documents were officials
in BazhouWaterManagement Bureau, Bazhou LandManage-ment Bureau, Bazhou Agriculture Bureau, Bazhou Forest
Bureau, Bazhou Price Management Bureau, and three coun-
ties watermanagement bureaus, landmanagement bureaus,
forest bureaus, and archive bureaus. As many important
issues in water management practices, such as water
distribution processes and water loss calculations, are not
stated in the government documents, the main strategy of
acquiring information on these issues was to interview
people holding positions in the system, mainly including
leaders and water managers at four river basin level water
management stations and five county level water manage-
ment stations. In total, three counties, four xiang (town), and c.
20 villages (production teams) were visited. In the villages,
both the village head (in many cases, the production team
head) and the party secretary were interviewed. The inter-
views with farmers usually took place following encounters
with people in the field. Often the discussionswere on a group
basis, whereby some people joined and some left during the
process.
3. Water management in Bazhou
Water management in China is a top-down government
management regime. In Bazhou, there are two levels of formal
government water management organizations in the local
government system: one at prefecture level, the other at
county level (Fig. 3). At the prefecture level, Bazhou Water
Conservancy Bureau (BWCB) (Bazhou shuiliju) is an adminis-
trative unit and enforces government political power over
water management at river basin level. The routine duty of
water management is undertaken by Bazhou Water Manage-
ment Department (BWMD) (Bazhou shuili guanlichu). BWMD is a
subordinate unit of BWCB and formally a so-called institute
unit, but operates as an enterprise, and is totally funded by
Fig. 3 – Water management organizations in Bazhou.
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distribution at river basin level, guidance and control of water
infrastructure development, and various other economic
activities (zonghe jingying), including agricultural farming,
livestock farming and aquaculture. The department also runs
a hotel. BWMD is responsible for preparing the plans for the
water quota to be supplied to the primary canals.
A fundamental policy of water management in Bazhou is a
16 Chinese characters policy: ‘quota of supply water to each
county [each main canal has a quota]; each county decides on
water distribution and schedule itself; water price will be5 A unit with the character of both an institute and an enterprise
is known as an institute unit managed as an enterprise (shiye
danwei, qiye guanli). At present, there are three kinds of unit (dan-
wei) in China. An administrative unit (xingzheng danwei) is a gov-
ernmental political unit, where the employees are civil servants.
The unit is funded by the state and the number of employees is
strictly limited. An institute unit (shiye danwei) deals with public
issues but has no governmental political power. It is partly funded
by the government, and partly by income from customers of the
services provided. The limit on the number of employees is flex-
ible. An enterprise unit (qiye danwei) runs on a commercial basis,
derives its income from business, and there is no limit on the
number of people it can employ. The document of XUAR People’s
Government (1983) states that the water conservancy manage-
ment units belong to productive service units of institutional
character, are managed according to the demand from enter-
prises, control their financial affairs themselves, and are respon-
sible for their own profits and losses (Clause 3).doubled if more than the quota is used; thrifty use of water to
expand irrigated areas’ (BWMD, 1997). Today, each county has
a water supply quota allotted to it by BWMD, mainly based on
the irrigated area reported by each county. However, thewater
supply quota is not fixed, and BWMDhas the right to adjust the
water supply quota according to water and land situation
changes in Bazhou. Water users below the county level do not
have such quota. This means that villages and individual
farmers have rights to water, but do not have rights regarding
issues such as when, how much, and with what frequency
water will be supplied.
At the county level, the county water conservancy bureau
(CWCB) is the administrative unit responsible for enforcing
the regulations governing water administration. The county
water management general station (CWMGS) is a subordinate
unit of the CWCB, and is responsible for routine water
distribution at county level. Like BWMD, the CWMGS is an
institute unit but is totally funded by water fees. All inlets of
primary canals are managed by BWMD, but water distribution
and maintenance of the primary canals are the duty of the
CWCB. There are several basic level water management
stations responsible for water distribution in each county.
However, no common regulations exist on how water should
be distributed, and each basic levelwatermanagement station
has its own water distribution practices. The basic level water
management stations – which are at the lowest level of the
government water management structure – distribute water
to villages via the primary or secondary canals.
BWMDadvocates thatwatermanagement at the basic level
watermanagement stations should be carried out according to
the slogan ‘four to a household’ (sidaohu, meaning that each
household should be regarded as a unit in terms of water
distribution and measurement, settling accounts and collect-
ing water fees).6 The practical meaning of the policy is that
BWMD sells waterwholesale to each CWCB, and each CWCB is
expected to retail water to individual households. Water fee
collection has become the focal point of watermanagement in
government water management units. Under the existing
system, farmers’ actual water fees are calculated on the basis
of water volume multiplied by the water price fixed by the
governmentwatermanagement units. In 2001, thewater price
was set by BWCB at 3.1 fen/m3 (in 2001, 1 USD = 8.3 yuan,
1 yuan = 100 fen) for water diverted from the Kaidu River and
4.97 fen/m3 for water diverted from the Kongque River.
Qigexing Water Management Station (QWMS) in Yanqi
County is usedhere as an example of howwater ismanaged by
the basic level water management station. Qigexing Water
Management Station (QWMS) is responsible for water man-6 It is not practical to measure the volume of water supplied to
individual farmer’s land. One plot of land may be managed by
several households and planted with different crops, each with
differing water requirements. The basic level water management
stations measured water volume at inlets in production teams’
canals, and calculated water fees to production teams as basic
units. The production teams then apportioned the water fees to
individual households. Farmers usually paid water fees to produc-
tion teams, and the production teams then handed the water fees
to the basic level water management stations. In some cases,
farmers paid water fees directly to the basic level water manage-
ment stations.
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which is located on the alluvial plain of Yanqi County. The
western part of Qigexing town is desert and has very little
vegetation; by contrast, the eastern part is a developed
irrigation agricultural region. In 2001, Qigexing town had
seven villages, with a combined population of c. 13,000, and
with Han Chinese, Uyghur, Hui, and Mongolian peoples
accounting for 51%, 34%, 9%, and 6% of the total population
respectively (interview data). In the first round of land
contracts in 1984, the total area of contract land was
43,000 mu (‘mu’ is unit of land area; 1 ha = 15 mu) in Qigexing
town. Since then, large areas of wasteland have been opened
up. In the second round of land contracts in 1998, the total
contract land area was still 43,000 mu, as newly opened-up
wasteland had not been registered in the contract land books.
Land is managed by the land management bureau, but the
bureau has no responsibility for measuring land again after
the contract land books have been issued. In principle, the
owners of the new land have to pay water fees, but the
production teams’ data relating to thenew land are not clear in
this respect. When water fees are apportioned to contract
land, someone will inevitably gain at another’s expense, and
this makes water fee collection difficult. In 2001, QWMS
measured the total land area as c. 66,000 mu (interview data).
The Dabalong Canal is the only water supply canal in Qigexing
town, and it has 13 branch canals diverting water to the
villages. The Dabalong Canal contains water from early April
to the end of October. When the canal has water, all branch
canals have someamount of flow. Thus, in practice, rotation in
branch canals simply means either greater or lesser flow. As
all branch canals receive some flow of water, the main task of
QWMS is to adjust the size of the flow in the branch canals.
The vice-head of thewatermanagement station is responsible
for flow adjustment at the inlet of each branch canal, and
while one water manager carries out the actual task, another
will measure the water volume. As a consequence of the
increase in irrigated area, the time taken for one round of
irrigation has been gradually prolonged, and it is very difficult
to adjust water flow in branch canals according to farmers’
requirements.
BWMD collects water fees from QWMS based on water
volume, which is measured at the QWMS water receiving
point in the Dabalong Canal, and then the total water volume
is multiplied by the water price, which is decided by BWCB.
QWMS then charges thewater fees to production teams. There
is no formal water management organization in villages. The
head of the production team is responsible for water issues in
each production team, and a water manager is elected by
villagers or appointed by the head of a production team. The
water managers in QWMS usually measure water volume
once, in themorning, at the inlets of production teams’ branch
canals, and water managers in production teams are asked to
be present, but water managers in production teams are not
usually present. In general, this is because water managers in
production teams cannot understand how water volume is
calculated. In addition, the water flow is not stable in branch
canals but fluctuates throughout the day, which may lead to
big errors when calculating water volume data. In 2001, the
Dabalong Canal was an unlined canal; the length from the
water receiving point to the end of the Dabalong Canal is c.10 km.Water conveyance efficiency in the Dabalong Canal is c.
70–85% according to weather conditions (interview data).
Water losses in the Dabalong Canal are large and constantly
changing. When water fees are calculated, water losses in the
Dabalong Canal are added to the calculations. The water
volume to be paid for is much greater than the actual water
volume delivered and signed for. This means that farmers
have to pay for water losses in the canals that they have no
right to manage. Farmers pay water fees, despite the fact that
it is difficult for them to monitor the water measurement and
calculation processes.
Water supply and water fee collection by villages are
interlinked. The rule is that production teams that hand over
water fees on time will receive water on time. In cases when
production teams do not hand over water fees on time, QWMS
has the right to stop their water supplies. In 2003, the yearly
average water fee was 38–98 yuan/mu. Some farmers are
unwilling to pay water fees because of the poor quality of the
water supplied, while others are poor and cannot afford the
water fees. Even if a farmer’s land only receives one round of
irrigation and nothing is harvested, he/she still has to pay for
the round of irrigation. If the task of collecting water fees is
unfinished, the whole production team is unable to receive
water on time, because a production team is treated as the
basic unit for water volume measurement. For example, in
2003 due to some poor farmers not paying their fees,
Production Team No. 6 in Harmaodong village was unable
to pay in full and consequently QWMS did not supply water to
the team until all of the water fees had been paid in full. The
first round irrigation of wheat was delayed until the 10th of
May, when it should have taken place between the 15th and
20th of April. Such delays are very harmful for the overall
wheat yield, and hence even rich farmers may be reduced to
poverty due to a few poor farmers failing to pay their fees.
4. Policies relating to environmental
protection in Xinjiang
At the beginning of 2004, XUARPeople’s Government issued an
environmental protection document (XUAR People’s Govern-
ment, 2004). In Clause 1 – To encourage people to convert
wastemountain land andwasteland to vegetation – it is stated
that when waste mountain land and wasteland are converted
to forest or grass, people are exempt from paying the land use
fee, and land use rights can be kept for 50 years without
change.
Clause 10 deals with the conversion of the barren desert
grassland contracted by herdsmen. When the environmental
protection project involves grassland, the herdsmen will be
compensated according to the minimum standards of
compensation and the lowest grade of grassland, on the
principle that it will not reduce the herdsmen’s original
income levels and living conditions. However, if there are
other places available that are suitable for grazing, no
compensation will be paid.
In 2002, the Bazhou People’s Government issued a docu-
ment titled the ‘trees and paper integration project’ as one
package of Three North (sanbei) ecological environmental
protection project (Bazhou People’s Government, 2002). The
7 The Korla city domestic use water conveyance project (the
water source construction project) was finished in 2003; it was
very costly and financed by The World Bank’s Tarim Basin II
Project (The World Bank, 1998). The water source is groundwater
from nearby Qigexing town.
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them. The basic idea was that trees could protect the
environment, and in the future income could be earned
through making paper. The Bazhou People’s Government
drew up a detailed plan to put the project into practice. Clause
2 stipulates the development of areas of fast-growing trees as
follows: 320,000 mu in the Kaidu River irrigation area, and
280,000 mu in the Kongque and Dina River irrigation area.
Clause 3 of the document provides incentives for units and
people who plant fast-growing trees in the wastelands as
follows: (1) Approval to receive and issue of land use rights
licenses for 50–70 years; (2) For land where surface water is
used to irrigate the fast-growing trees, water volumes are to be
included in the agricultural water use plan, and these lands
shall have priority when it comes to receiving water. In the
Kaidu River irrigation area, landwhich is used for fast-growing
trees is exempt from water fees. In the Kongque River
irrigation area, land with fast-growing trees is charged only
10% of the agricultural water fee. Payment can be postponed
until the fourth year. From the fourth to the tenth year, water
fees are paid on the basis of half of the agricultural water price.
To encourage people to dig wells to irrigate the trees, wells are
exempt from inclusion in water resource fees for the first 5
years, and with regard to electricity supplies, pump wells are
given priority.
Under Clause 7, new companies and enterprises which
plant fast-growing trees can be exempt from enterprise
income tax for 3 years, and up to year 2010 will pay 15%
enterprise income tax, compared to the normal enterprise
income tax rate of 33%.
Under Clause 10, the Bazhou People’s Government will
allocate 2 million yuan from interest-deducted funds (which
are for the development of special economies) and use this for
the tree and paper integration project.
In 2005, a new water fee document was issued by the
Bazhou People’s Government (Bazhou People’s Government,
2005). The document stated that in principle it will not supply
water to newly opened-up wasteland, although water may be
supplied at double the normal water price at times when the
supply of water is abundant (Clause 1, Section 3). The
document also stated that those who take responsibility for
development projects relating to ecological forests will be
exempt from paying water fees (Clause 3, Section 3). In
practice, in Bazhou the policy has been interpreted asmeaning
that planting trees should be given priority in terms of water
supply, regardless of where they are planted and by what
means water is conveyed to the site. Water distribution has
therefore been undergoing a new adjustment process.
Themain goal of the tui geng huan lin project is to protect the
environment, but the natural environment is desert, not
forest. Xinjiang is a land-rich but water-scarce dry region. No
appraisements of thewater use situation are carried out when
such central and local government environmental protection
projects are implemented. Water resources are basic social
and economic resources, especially in the dry region, and
furthermore, water resources are the basic agriculture
production element for farmers, yet when favourable policies
are provided for environmental protection projects, the
provisions for irrigation agriculture are not advantageous.
There is no discussion on the issue of equity and social justiceregarding water resources distribution in government envir-
onmental protection policies.
In the Yanqi Basin, the main agricultural problem is the
high level of the groundwater table and high salinity level of
the soils. In the desert, soils are coarse-textured and have high
levels of salinity. Because there are no canals in good physical
condition, both the water volume for the irrigation of fast-
growing trees and seepages from soils are huge. This is
accompanied by large amounts of salts being washed into the
groundwater, worsening soil conditions in the lower reaches
of existing farmland. Drainage water that contains high levels
of salinity is drained into Bosteng Lake.
In the trees and paper integration project, the most serious
problem is that the waste water from the paper mills is not
mentioned at all. Several paper mills, such as the Bazhou
paper mill and Bingtuan Agriculture Division No. 2’s paper
mill, are located near Bosteng Lake. There, reeds are cut as raw
materials and thewastewater is drained into the lake or at the
place near the Kongque River bed, seriously polluting the
water. Officials have mentioned that water quality in the
whole Kongque River is below the state standard for drinking
water. However, people in Korla city are able to drink water
conveyed from the upper reaches of the Kaidu River.7 Drinking
water supplied to people living in the rural area of Korla city
and the lower reaches of the Kongque River is of bad quality
and not suitable for drinking.
In the following section, I will describe the practices of the
environmental protection projects in Bazhou using evidence
from two counties, Yanqi County in the upper reaches the
Kaidu-Kongque River Basin and Yuli County in the lower
reaches.
5. The practice of the environmental
protection projects
On one occasion, I interviewed the leaders in Yanqi CWCB
about environmental protection:
Interviewer: What is environmental protection?
Response: Environmental protection is planting trees, to make
wasteland become green.
Interviewer: Is the grapevine a tree or not?
Response: Yes, the grapevine is taller than other crops, and can
prevent wind and sandstorms from invading farmland.
Interviewer: Does planting trees in the desert belong to the state
project of tui geng huan lin?
Response: Yes, the desert belongs to the periphery of cultivated
land, and planting trees there has an environmental protection
function.
In Yanqi County,most tui geng huan lin land is located in the
desert, on the periphery of the agricultural area of Qigexing
town. From 2001 to 2004, c. 18,000 mu of trees were planted,
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favoured under central government policies, but also under
Bazhou People’s Government’s ‘trees and paper integration
project’. After 2001, a private developer planted tree belts
amounting to more than 2100 mu in the desert in Qigexing,
and a new canal was dug for the tree belts, with an inlet in the
Dabalong Canal (Supp. 4 and 5).8
One project for carrying out the environmental protection
projects has been the grape base construction project in
Qigexing town. This was started in 1999 with the aim of
planting 70,000 mu of grapevines in the western desert on the
periphery of the agricultural area of Qigexing town in the
period 2002–2007. The location is considered by experts to be
suitable for growing grapes, and the government believes
grapevines to be good for environmental protection because
they can prevent wind and dust storms. As part of the
government’s favourable policies, neither land use rights nor
water fees are applied. By the end of 2002, 11,000 mu of young
grapevines had been planted by village farmers and private
enterprises in the desert in Qigexing. Of these private
enterprises, Winery Z is an interesting case, as will be
described in the following.
In the spring of 2000, I visitedWinery Z for the first time. In
the desert, land had been ploughed by tractors, and thousands
of cement posts had been erected in the sandy and stony soils.
A big plantation called Winery Z was in the process of being
developed (Supp. 6). In 2002, when I visited the place for the
second time, a winery factorywas under construction;Winery
Z had even hired several French experts to guide the
construction. Bazhou People’s Government intended to give
aid to the winery in the hope that it would be developed as an
international enterprise. Since the wine was to be sold on the
international market, the winery would encourage farmers to
plant grapevines, and farmers would then sell their grapes to
the winery, and thereby poverty would be eliminated in the
area. Winery Z itself had plans to develop 40,000 mu for
grapevines. It all looked very impressive. In 2004, I visited the
site again and gained further insights.
At the end of 2000,Winery Z had opened upwasteland and
planted grapevines on 5000 mu of land; it claimed, however,
to have opened up 29,000 mu. In Qigexing town, 6000 mu of
grapevines were planted by village farmers and other private
enterprises in the desert. In the winter of 2001, temperatures
were very low, and over large areas the young grapevines had
frozen and died. In the spring of 2002, only c. 500 mu of
grapevines remained on farmers’ land. In 2003, 3 years after
the grapevines had been planted, farmers began to harvest
grapes and sell them to the winery. Rather than paying in
cash, the winery paid them in the form of promissory notes
that had little binding force.9 The farmers complained about
this to the town government, and the town government8 The state’s favourable policy comprises a 100 kg/mu grain
subsidy every year for 8 years, a 20 yuan/mu education subsidy
for 8 years, and a one-off 50 yuan/mu young trees subsidy. In
addition, the mentioned developer enjoyed a 170,000 yuan sub-
sidy for the trees planted near State Highway 218 (i.e. a subsidy for
greening the state highway).
9 Some years ago payment by promissory notes (baitiaozi) was
prohibited by the central government.intervened. Ultimately, thewinery paid the promissory notes
in wine rather than cash, and the farmers each received
several boxes of wine. After losing 3 years’ worth of harvests,
angry farmers uprooted all of the grapevines from their land.
In 2004, the county government again asked farmers to finish
the task of planting 3000 mu of grapevines. Both the town
government and the forestry station kept books that
contained written records of responsibility, and the forestry
station was to be penalized if it did not finish the allocated
task. The town government again tried tomobilize farmers to
plant grapevines, but none were willing to do so. The town
forestry station wanted to measure the area of grapevines in
Winery Z, but the winery would not allow them to do so. The
main purpose of exaggerating the area under grapevines was
that the bigger the enterprise, the more favourable the
policies would be regarding the winery. Further, the leaders
wanted high figures as this would reflect their achievements
favourably in terms of their official careers.10 However, no
one actually knows or is concerned about how large the
plantation is.
Originally, it was supposed that Winery Z would pump
groundwater and use modern technology to save water,
namely by using the drip irrigation method. Drip irrigation
pipes lie on the surface of the ground, but since the plantation
is located in desert and the soils contain large amount of salts,
the salts need to bewashed out byflood irrigation. The sitewas
selected for a water source construction project under The
World Bank’s Tarim Basin II Project, which was to develop
water resources by pumping groundwater, mainly for supply-
ing drinking water to Korla city. Since more and more deep
wells are pumping water from groundwater in the region, the
level of the groundwater table has fallen, and the costs of
pumping water have become very high. Consequently, the
plantation uses large volumes of surface water.
Winery Z has planted tree belts covering an area of c. 300
mu around the vineyard. The tree belts could be irrigated by
surface water according to government policy. In 1999, the
winery applied and received a 0.8 million m3 surface water
quota from BWMD for the tree belts and the vineyard. The
tree belts need to be irrigated two times each month, with at
least eight rounds of irrigation per year—one round of
irrigation usually lasts between four and eight days in the
local coarse-textured soil conditions. An outlet to the
vineyard was opened by QWMS from the one branch canal
of the Dabalong Canal. Because owners of tree belts are
exempt from paying water fees according to BWCB, there
was no measurement of or limitation on water volume, and
some parts of the vineyard also received water when tree
belts had water.
In 2004, QWMS estimated thatWinery Z actually usesmore
than 3 million m3 water for the tree belts and the vineyard
combined each year, which was much more than its water
quota (0.8 million m3). BWCB transmitted a document to
QWMS to permit the winery to be exempt from water fees
for 5 years (1999–2003). The total water fees for the winery for
this periodwere estimated at 370,000 yuan by BWMDandwere
made exempt by BWMD. BWMD had calculated these water
fees based on the price of 31 yuan/mu (the water volume was10 See Shambaugh (2008) for a detailed discussion on this issue.
e n v i r onm en t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 1 2 ( 2 0 0 9 ) 9 7 0 – 9 8 0978determined at a rate of 1000 m3/mu gross irrigation norm, the
water price was 0.031 yuan/m3). The actual water use is,
however,more than 2000 m3/mu, and thewater fees should be
more than 62 yuan/mu according to QMWS. This extra water
was apportioned to canal conveyance losses, and ultimately it
was apportioned to and paid for by the local farmers.
The Chairwoman of Winery Z has won several medals at
the state andXinjiang levels (TianshanWeb, 2006). Thewinery
is stated as a miracle of hard work and wealth production.
According to Bazhou People’s Government (Bazhou Statistic
Information Web, 2003), the winery has won several interna-
tional medals, and the government will support it as a ‘dragon
head enterprise’ in Bazhou and will provide the winery with
favourable policies on water use, land use, finance, and
taxation.
Along with the priority of water supply to the land newly
planted with trees and grapevines, the normal order of water
supply to villages has been thrown into confusion. In mid-
April 2004, the weather was already warm and a dozen
farmers had gathered in QWMS in order to demand water. It
was the time to release the first round of water to the wheat
crops, and make land wet before sowing (yingou) for red
peppers and tomatoes as the saying goes: ‘a whole year’s
harvest depends on the spring’ (yi nian zhi ji zai yu chun). The
water management station was supplying water to the newly
planted trees and grapevines, and intentionally delayed water
supplies to villages, simply because water fees had not been
collected in full by most production teams, and it wanted to
force farmers to hand in their water fees more quickly.
Yuli County is located in the lower reaches of the Kongque
River. Since 1990, Yuli County has been carrying out irrigation
agricultural development and the irrigated area has increased,
water supply situation in the local villages has worsened, and
large areas of cultivated land in the local villages cannot
receive water on time. In 2002, Yuli County started to
implement the state tui geng huan lin project, and planned to
return 10,000 mu of cultivated land to forest.
According to a report by Yuli County Forest Bureau (2003),
in 2002 in Xingping xiang, 12 households with 3761 mu of
cultivated land were counted as having been ‘returned to
trees’. One Uyghur household had 913 mu of land ‘returned to
trees’ in Kongqi village, and one Han Chinese household had
2400 mu of land ‘returned to trees’ in Tongqike village.
Together, these two households accounted for 88% of the
total returned land. The Han Chinese household has opened
up more than 3000 mu of wasteland to plant cotton in recent
years and pumped water from the Kongque River to irrigate
the land. The distance from the land to the Kongque River is
considerable and hence irrigation is inconvenient, and the
cotton yield very low. However, the farmer had responded to
the state policy to plant trees on the land and enjoyed the
favourable policies. Accordingly, starting in 2002, every year
for eight years he can receive subsidies of 288,000 yuan from
the government for the newly opened up land.11 He has 30
years’ worth of land use rights and 50 years’ worth of tree
responsibility contracts, which is good business and hasmade
him a wealthy man.11 Author’s calculation: 2400 mu  120 yuan/mu = 288,000 yuan.Yuli County initiated one package of Three North (sanbei)
ecological environmental protection in the northern parts of
Yuli town in 2004. The goal was to plant trees on a
40 m  28 km stretch of wasteland along State Highway 218,
and the task was scheduled to finish in 2010. In spring 2004,
tractors and various heavy machines were working on the
wasteland, cutting down bushes and grass, and levelling the
wasteland. Two new canals were under construction. BWMD
approved a 3 million m3 water supply quota for the tree belts.
While many farmers in the local villages cannot obtain
sufficient water for their crops, precious water resources are
diverted to the trees to protect the desert environment. With
more and more water being diverted from the Kongque River
to the planted trees, water flow in the lower reaches of the
Kongque River decreases, and consequently the natural
poplars along the river banks of the lower reaches of the
Kongque River are drying up and dying.
6. Conclusion
The local water management policies and practices are
interlinked with central government and local government
policies on the environmental protection projects. When
equity and social costs are not factored into the planning of
new environmental protection projects, the social costs may
be as high as the environmental costs. This is demonstrated
by the fact, as discussed in Sections 4 and 5, that when
favourable policies are provided for environmental protec-
tion projects, water supply for irrigation agriculture is at
disadvantageous situation.Thebenefitsof theenvironmental
protection projects are enjoyed by a small number of
individuals. Foremost among these we can note rich devel-
opers who have taken advantage of government policies and
have the financial capability to open up wasteland. Because
the owners of newly planted trees are exempt from paying
water fees, farmers have to paywater fees for their ownwater
use and extra water fees to cover for the developers. It is
evident that the redistribution of water resources, in essence
is a redistribution of social and economic resources, but so far
there is scant discussion on this issue in China. This research
paper has shown that the environmental protection projects
not only fail to engage the fundamentally political character
and diverse circumstances of China’s geographical settings,
but also ignore the basic problem of social justice in the
distribution of water resources.
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